Federal Civil Procedure - Parties - Effect of Failure to Make Timely Application for Substitution for Deceased Party Defendant by Ostfield, Benjamin
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 35 Number 1 Article 5 
1959 
Federal Civil Procedure - Parties - Effect of Failure to Make Timely 
Application for Substitution for Deceased Party Defendant 
Benjamin Ostfield 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ostfield, Benjamin (1959) "Federal Civil Procedure - Parties - Effect of Failure to Make Timely Application 
for Substitution for Deceased Party Defendant," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 35 : No. 1 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol35/iss1/5 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
1959] RECENT CASES 73
the same transaction. 10 The North Dakota Rules provide that an indictment
or information can charge only one offense.11
The dissenting justices argued that the prosecution had in effect tried
the accused for four murders three successive times. They further stated that
this harassment of the defendant is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It.might be nated that there are several aspects to this argument that merit
careful investigation. When the problem is viewed in the light of "fairness"
to the parties, the state's unlimited finances place a tremendous burden on
the defendant. Funds are usually available to locate key witnesses no matter
where they are, and the prosecutor may expect greater cooperation from
the police in his jurisdiction12 When this is combined with the power of
the prosecutor to use these unlimited finances to harass the defendant through
repeated litigation it bcomes a dangerous weapon in the hands of a zealous
prosecutor. It might also be noted that it is an unwarranted expenditure of
money and valuable court time to relitigate matters that could just as well be
settled in one trial. It further stands to reason, as proven in the principal case,
that as the number of trials is increased, the chances of the desired verdict
are likewise increased.
Since the principle of due process is generally identified with the concept
of fairness in the procedural aspect, 13 it might be well to note of what
this fairness consists. In deciding this problem, two questions must be
resolved: "Is that kind of double jeopardy . . . a hardship so acute and
shocking that our polity will not endure it? Does it violate those fundamental
principals of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions?"14
KEITHE E. NELSON.
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE - PARTIES - EFFECT OF FAILURE TO MAKE
TImELY APPLICATION FOR SUBSTITUTION FOR DECEASED PARTY DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff brought an action against Sims and Navarra. Navarra then died.
After two years had elapsed, a motion was made to dismiss the action as to
Navarra on the basis of Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(a) (1), which provides that: "If
a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court within two
years after the death may order substitution of the proper parties. If sub-
stitution is not so made, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased
party." The District Court, in denying the motion, held that Fed.R.Civ.P.
25(a) (1) was invalid insofar as it attempted to abridge plaintiff's substantive
right to bring her action to trial by placing a fixed time limit upon her right
to apply for a substitution for the deceased party defendant.1 Henrbry v. Sims,
22 F.R.D. 10 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
The case presents a striking issue of procedural law. In Anderson v. Yungkau,-
11. N.D. Rev. Code § 29-1404 1B (1943); but see N.D. Rev. Code § 29-1149 (1943).
12. See Ludwig, The Role of the Prosecutor in a Fair Trial, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 602, 608,
609 (1956).
13. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1952)- United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941).
2. 329 U.S. 482 (1947); iofheimer v. Melntee, 179 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1950);
Winkleman v. General Motors Corp., 30 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Anderson v.
Brady, 1 F.R.D. 589 (E.D. Ky. 1941).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the Supreme Court of the United States held that Rule 25 acts as a statute
of limitations upon the right of revivor and is mandatory in character.
requiring a trial court to dismiss any action not revived within the two year
period. It was further held that Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), which permits extensions
of time in cases where failure to comply with a time limit imposed by the
Rules has been due to excusable neglect, cannot be applied to extend the
time limit established by Rule 25. The holding of the principal case seems
squarely in conflict with this precedent.
The District Court based its ruling in the principal case on the authority
of Perry v. Allen.3 In that case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
if Rule 25 is applied inflexibly it abridges the substantive rights enjoyed
by a plaintiff, distinguishing Anderson v. Yungkau on the ground that it was
decided in reality on a point of substantive law. The contention was that at
the time that the Anderson case was decided there was in force 28 U.S.C.
§ 778- a two-year federal statute of limitations which was merely imple-
mented procedurally by Rule 25; that the subsequent repeal of this statute4
in turn automatically left various state statutes of limitations on the right
of revivor in force.5 The Circuit Court stated in the Allen case that Rule 25(a)
couldn't possibly operate as a statute of limitations upon the revivor. A
"statute", they said, must be the act of a 'legislative body". The placing
of an absolute time limit upon the assertion of a right goes to the substance
of the right even though such an act is catalogued as relating to the remedy
alone.6 The Court stated further that such a limitation may be imposed only
by legislative authority, and it is beyond the competence of a court to
exercise its power to formulate rules of procedure.
But Perry v. Allen - and thus the instant case - appears to be questionable.
Examination of the legislative history involved in the repeal of the two-year
statute of limitations indicates that the repeal was not intended to act as a
legislative reversal of the policy embodied in Anderson v. Yungkau. Such a
repeal of § 778 gave Rule 25 the force and effect of a statute.7 It occurred
in the course of a revision of Title 28 of the United States Code which
had for its essential purpose "the substitution of plain language for awkward
terms, reconciliation of conflicting laws, repeal of superseded sections, and
consolidation of related provisions."8 Indeed, the explanation of the House
Judiciary Committee for the repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 778 was that it was
superseded by Rules 25 and 81. To suggest that by the incidental repeal of
the statute Congress overturned the rule of Anderson v. Yungkau is 1o say that
the revision was self-defeating and that Congress achieved a result precisely
opposite to what it intended.9 All Federal Rules carry a presumption of
validity, and must not be interpreted to be invalid in the absence of most
3. 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
4. 62 Stat. 869 (1948).
5. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
6. 239 F.2d 107, citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394 (1946); Barthel v.
Stamm, 145 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1944).
7. Foltz v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); ef. 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1952).
8. -Foltz v. Moore-McCornack Lines, Inc., supra, note 7, citing Reprint from Committee
on Judiciary, House of Representativ&s, to accompany H.R. 3214, H.R. 308 (80th Congress,
1st session)' p. 2.
9. Foltz v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 'supra, note 7.
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convincing arguments to the contrary,10 or where a contrary and valid
interpretation exists. 1
North Dakota is not faced with the problem of the principal case. In
drafting N.D.R.Civ.P. 25, the two-year time limit was omitted and it was
provided merely that if substitution is not made within a "reasonable time",
the action "may" be dismissed as to the deceased party. The problems arising
from this version of the rule are, of course, sui generis.
BENJAMIN OSTFIELD.
HIGHWAYS - RIGHT OF ABUTTING OWNERS - RIGHT OF ACCESS. - The owner
of a parking garage on a comer lot with vehicular access to a street on one
side of lot was denied access to the other street. The basis of the denial was
a city ordinance providing that no permit shall be isued for the construction of
any curb cut or driveway leading onto portions of designated streets. He
sought a writ of mandamus against the city of San Antonio to compel the
issuance of a permit. The Supreme Court of Texas held, two justices dissenting,
that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city's police power. San Antonio
v. Pigeonhole Parking, 311 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1958).
The weight of authority is that the right of access is an easement
appurtenant' to the abutting land2 and a valuable property right
3 
which
cannot be taken except by the exercise of the power of eminent domain
upon payment of just compensation. 4 Although complete prohibition of the
right of access is a taking of property without due process 5 this right may be
10. Gertler v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
11. Bowles v. Tankar Gas, 5 F.R.D. 230 (D.C. Minn. 1946). It should be noted that
dismissal in accordance with Rule 25 is not an adjudication on the merits. United States
v. Saunders Petroleum Co., 7 F.R.D. 608 (W.D. Mo. 1947) and consequently does not
bar the commencement of another action on the same claim through any application of
the principles of res iudicata. In re Hoover Co., 30 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 927, 134 F.2d 624,
628 (1943). Although in many instances further litigation would undoubtedly be barred
by the statute of limitations regulating the life of the claim, this result is not directly at-
tributable to Rule 25 itself.
1. Rose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); Minnequa Lumber Co. v.
Denver, 67 Colo. 472, 186 Pac. 539 (1920); Howell v. Board of Comm'rs, 169 Ga. 74,
149 S.E. 779 (1929); Continental Oil Co. v. Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89, 286 Pac. 353
(1930); O'Brien v. Central Iron and Steel Co., 158 Ind. 218, 63 N.E. 302 (1902);
Hathaway v. Sioux City, 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 228 (1953); State v. Department of
Highways, 200 La. 409, 8 So.2d 71 (1942); Wenton v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 78,
138 N.E.2d 609 (1956); Hillerege v. Scottsbluff, 164 Neb. 560, 83 N.W.2d 76 (1957);
Shawnee v. Robbins Bros. Tire Co., 134 Okla. 142, 272 Pac. 457 (1928); State, By and
Through State Highway Comm'n v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P.2d 783 (1954); Newman
v. Mayor of Newport, 73 R.I. 385, 57 A.2d 173 (1948); Gulf Refining Co. v. Dallas,
10 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1928); Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943);
Royal Transit, Inc. v. West Milwaukee, 266 Wis. 271, 63 N.W.2d 62 (1954).
2. "When no land intervenes between the land of the abutter and the street, his
property is said to abut." 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 30.55, (3rd ed. 1950).
3. Pure Oil Co. v. Northlake, 10 Ill.2d 241, 140 N.E.2d 289 (1957); Anzalone v.
Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 257 Mass. 32, 153 N.E. 325 (1926); Cummings v. Minot,
67 N.D. 214, 271 N.W. 421 (1937).
4. Iowa State Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957);
Breining v. County of Allegheny, 332 Pa. 474, 2 A.2d 842 (1938); Newman v. Mayor of
Newport, 73 R.I. 385, 57 A.2d 173 (1948). Contra, Alexander Co. v. Owatonna, 222
Minn. 312, 24 N.W.2d 244 (1946).
5. Brownlow v. O'Donoghue Bros., Inc., 276 Fed. 636 (D.C. Cir. 1921); Pure Oil Co.
v. Northlake, 10 11l.2d 241, 140 N.E.2d 289 (1957); Cummings v. Minot, 67 N.D. 214,
271 N.W. 421 (1937). But see Alexander Co. v. Owatonna, supra note 4.
